News · British racing
BGC's £500m racing forecast leaves the Levy impact unclear
The Betting and Gaming Council forecasts that £500 million will be wagered with illegal operators during Britain's National Hunt season. Its 13 November warning also puts expected illegal stakes during Cheltenham's three-day November Meeting at £10 million.
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The warning raises a legitimate concern about customers using services outside British regulation and about the money supporting racing. Establishing the financial effect on the sport, however, requires several steps between the amount wagered and the contribution that racing might otherwise receive.
BGC chief executive Grainne Hurst called for cooperation with government and the Gambling Commission against illegal operators. The trade body's release does not explain how it calculated either forecast. That limits independent testing of the figures without removing the need to investigate the underlying risk.
A seasonal forecast needs a defined measurement base
The BGC describes its season window as October to April. Cheltenham's organiser lists the November Meeting for 13 to 15 November, placing that event within the broader period covered by the warning.
The two forecasts should therefore be read with their different timeframes intact. The meeting estimate should not automatically be added to the seasonal total, and neither is an observed account of bets already placed across the completed season.
| Figure | What it describes | Status and period |
|---|---|---|
| £500m | Stakes forecast by BGC | Its October-to-April National Hunt season window |
| £10m | Stakes forecast by BGC | Cheltenham's November Meeting, 13 to 15 November 2026 |
| £110m | Horserace Betting Levy income reported by HBLB | 2025/26, cited in its 2 October funding announcement |
The third figure measures a different financial flow. Dividing or comparing it directly with estimated stakes would obscure the relationship that needs to be established.
A reproducible forecast would explain the races, customers and operators covered, the underlying evidence and how activity is converted into pounds wagered. It should also explain how repeated customers, overlapping websites and uncertainty are handled. A headline total supplies none of those answers on its own.
Racing's statutory funding turns on betting profits
The Horserace Betting Levy has a long history. As the House of Commons Library explains, it began in 1961 to return some off-course betting proceeds to racing after customers gained the ability to bet without attending a racecourse. Reforms in 2017 extended its reach to qualifying bets placed with overseas remote operators.
The current HBLB rules charge 10% on the amount by which statutory profits from leviable bets exceed the £500,000 exemption, with shared exemption rules for related operators. The assessment concerns eligible betting profits rather than all stakes or the company's final earnings after every operating expense.
That makes payouts and statutory adjustments important. Money returned as winnings can also be wagered again, increasing turnover without an equivalent new deposit. A seasonal wagering figure cannot be treated as customers' net losses or bookmakers' retained income.
The next question is what would have happened in a regulated alternative. Some illegal betting might replace bets with a Levy-paying bookmaker; some might represent activity that would have been reduced or would not have occurred through a licensed service.
Only after identifying the relevant activity, its likely statutory profit and the applicable exemption arrangements could a model estimate the Levy contribution forgone. Applying the Levy percentage directly to £500 million of stakes would use the wrong base.
Recent receipts show why turnover is only part of the story
HBLB's 2 October announcement cited £110 million in Levy income for 2025/26 when setting out a planned £2.2 million increase in its prize-money contribution for 2027. Its reserves also supported that decision.
Earlier, its 3 June update had reported average betting turnover per race down 1.2% on 2024/25 while provisionally projecting the £110 million yield. The later announcement uses the income figure in its funding plans, so the June projection should not be presented as the latest available account.
An average per race is a different measure from total annual stakes. The reports nevertheless show why income has to be analysed through bookmakers' gross win and the statutory calculation, rather than inferred from a single turnover indicator.
They also leave a counterfactual question. Healthy receipts do not establish that racing has suffered no loss relative to what it could have received. Equally, declining turnover cannot establish how much of a change came from illegal operators rather than other shifts in betting activity.
Periods and sporting coverage matter too. The BGC warning concerns a winter season window; HBLB's income covers a financial year and the wider eligible racing business. A credible funding estimate would align those boundaries before attributing a loss.
Website engagement supplies evidence of another kind
Our earlier analysis of the IFHA research on Britain's illegal betting market examined why traffic, stakes and financial market share answer different questions. That distinction remains essential when assessing the BGC's racing forecast.
The Gambling Commission's dashboard published on 5 November provides a useful comparison. It estimates that engagement with identified illegal gambling websites in September was 12% above the previous three-month average, but 11% below September 2025.
The measure uses modelled visits and visit duration to estimate time spent on identified sites. It is an indicator of engagement, with coverage and estimation limits, rather than a transaction record or a measurement of racing stakes.
The different comparisons can coexist: a short-term increase alongside a lower year-on-year figure. Neither supplies a direct conversion into the £500 million seasonal forecast. Nor does a measure covering identified illegal gambling sites isolate the financial effect on British horseracing.
The evidence can still help investigators identify patterns and test whether disruption changes behaviour. Its usefulness improves when its unit, coverage and limitations remain visible.
Enforcement should be measured through outcomes
The latest warning follows a change in the emphasis of enforcement. On 9 November, the Gambling Commission described wider action against payments, advertising, assets and access to gambling content, alongside website disruption.
It said referrals since January concerned more than £40 million in suspected criminal funds for partner agencies to consider potential asset freezing. That is a referral figure, with subsequent decisions and outcomes still required to establish what has been frozen or recovered.
As our report on the crackdown on illegal gambling money and assets explained, action against the business infrastructure matters alongside action against individual websites.
For racing, the relevant financial evidence would include whether illegal activity declines and whether any corresponding eligible business returns to Levy-paying operators. Recoveries, website removals and higher licensed turnover are separate outcomes; their values cannot simply be added together as money restored to the sport.
Consumer protection also has a value independent of racing's receipts. Some people may reduce or stop gambling after an intervention. Effective protection should therefore be assessed through access to illegal services and consumer outcomes as well as the amount of licensed betting that follows.
A stronger forecast would make the warning more useful
The BGC represents licensed betting and gaming businesses, giving it a direct interest in the policy debate. Its warning can identify a serious concern while still requiring transparent evidence before the amount is used to price racing's exposure.
Our judgement is that the next useful step is publication of the forecast's assumptions and a separate account of the funding mechanism. That would allow racing, regulators and policymakers to test the estimated stakes and the range of possible effects on Levy income.
Sponsorship and other commercial support would need their own analysis. Those relationships can be affected by the economics of betting businesses, but do not follow automatically from the statutory Levy formula.
British racing has a clear reason to care where betting takes place and whether the businesses involved contribute. The £500 million forecast sets out the scale of BGC's concern. Demonstrating the resulting funding loss requires the calculation between those two points.