Sportradar Share Price, Stock Chart and Outlook

Research updated: 13 November 2026. This analysis examines Sportradar Group AG's listed shares, reported financial performance and a 12-24-month business outlook. Historical share prices are dated; they are not presented as a live quote or a forecast.

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The investment question separates business growth, cash after sports-rights commitments and the price paid per listed share. Growth does not automatically make a stock attractive.

An undated “Sportradar share price today” is not trustworthy. A quote needs a source, session, currency, timestamp and delay status. A historical close is not a live trade. See the Sportradar corporate overview for the wider group.

Sportradar's Nasdaq-listed Class A shares trade in US dollars. When comparing their performance over one month, six months, one year or longer, check the chart's date range, price adjustments and trading-session information. Historical closing prices are not live quotations.

Sportradar's own investor-relations historical lookup offers a concrete, dated illustration. It displayed the following US-dollar closing prices for early November 2026:

Source: Sportradar's official historical price lookup, supplied by LSEG. The source states a minimum 15-minute delay and includes an adjustment policy. These are historical closes, not a current quote or a replacement for an interactive chart.

Those closes changed markedly within days, but cannot establish why investors traded. A credible longer chart needs real observations, consistent adjustments and a dated endpoint, not a line invented between selected examples.

For British readers, the currency distinction is equally practical. Some brokerage listings describe the company's Swiss shares with CHF 0.10 nominal value. That is a share-capital designation, not a live quotation of SRAD in Swiss francs or pence. A chart silently converted from another currency or trading venue would fail the basic identity test.

Nasdaq-listed SRAD represents Class A shares in Sportradar Group AG, not direct stakes in its UK subsidiary, Swiss operating company or sportsbook clients.

The capital structure also deserves more attention than the ticker alone. The FY2025 Form 20-F describes greater voting influence for Class B holders with the same amount of invested capital. A Class B share has one-tenth the nominal value of a Class A share, while the voting-table footnote assigns one vote to each issued share. Class B shares are exchangeable for Class A shares on a ten-for-one basis, subject to customary adjustments. Voting influence and economic ownership are therefore different measurements.

In the ownership table dated 12 March 2026, founder and chief executive Carsten Koerl was attributed 78.7% of combined voting power. That figure does not mean he held 78.7% of the freely traded Class A shares or 78.7% of the group's economic value. Investors who care about board accountability should consider the voting structure alongside earnings, not infer governance from market capitalisation alone. The ownership and management analysis examines that distinction in depth.

Sportradar's investor-relations FAQ says it does not currently pay dividends. Its capital-return case therefore concerns reinvestment and repurchases, not an established yield.

Four events provide a useful reading framework for the stock's recent history:

1. November 2025: Sportradar completed the IMG ARENA acquisition, adding sports betting data and audiovisual rights. The investment case began to include both the potential value of the enlarged portfolio and the cost of integrating and maintaining those rights.
2. 3 March 2026: The company announced an expansion of its authorised share-repurchase plan to US$1 billion alongside FY2025 results. An authorisation is permission to repurchase, not an announcement that the full sum has been spent.
3. 7 October 2026: Sportradar announced an agreement to sell Atrium Sports for US$170 million. On 3 November it said completion was expected in Q4 2026, subject to conditions; that was not confirmation that proceeds had already been received.
4. 3 November 2026: The company reported Q3 and nine-month results, including strong betting-content revenue growth, rights-related expenditure and an updated account of executed repurchases.

These events inform chart interpretation but do not prove what caused a daily price move. See history and acquisitions for the transaction record.

The gap between an approved buyback and an executed one is unusually important for SRAD. The 3 November 2026 earnings release sets out the following sequence:

The US$1 billion is the total authorised capacity, not the amount executed. Nor should the cumulative 34 million shares be treated as proof of a matching reduction in every measure of shares outstanding without checking treasury shares, conversions and any share-based compensation effects.

Buybacks can improve the claim of remaining shareholders on future earnings if shares are retired economically, cash is deployed efficiently and the business maintains adequate funding. But repurchases also compete with sports-rights payments, acquisitions and investment in technology. A buyback made at a demanding price can deliver a weaker return than the same cash used to reduce operational risk.

With different voting classes, fewer Class A shares need not imply a proportional change in founder control. Per-share cash generation matters more than the headline buyback count.

Sportradar's accounts provide a more useful starting point than an unverified analyst target. The figures below are group consolidated numbers in euros; they are not the value of its Nasdaq shares in dollars.

FY2025 audited group figures and the company's 3 November 2026 unaudited interim release. The columns are unequal periods; do not treat them as like-for-like annual growth rates.

For a comparable nine-month view, revenue increased from €921.1m in 2025 to €1,086.8m in 2026. Adjusted EBITDA rose from €207.4m to €244.5m. Yet IFRS profit for the same nine months declined from €95.9m to €17.2m. The contrast is not a contradiction: adjusted EBITDA excludes items that affect reported profit. It is a warning against using a single non-IFRS margin as a complete valuation argument.

Cash also requires careful reading. At 30 September 2026, Sportradar held €190.1m in cash and equivalents and reported approximately €440m of total liquidity including an undrawn credit facility. These are different amounts: a facility increases potential funding availability but is not cash already in the bank. Nine-month free cash flow of €176.6m also coexisted with substantial repurchases and investment in sports rights.

The 3 November release gave management guidance, not a realised outcome, for FY2026: revenue of approximately €1,518-1,533m and adjusted EBITDA of €360-368m at then-current exchange rates. It excluded any impact from the proposed Atrium Sports divestiture because closing timing remained uncertain. For the full reconciliation and rights-cost context, consult Sportradar's financial results and business model and technology.

A broker target is an opinion; an algorithmic “Buy” is a different model's output; a current quote is a market observation. None is a reported financial result.

I have not treated the different consensus snapshots in the research results as one reliable, current average. A credible consensus table needs an observation date, the number of analysts, their measurement period and a consistent current-price benchmark. Without those, a quoted “upside percentage” is simply a calculation against an unspecified or obsolete price.

I therefore give no invented dollar target or vendor-derived buy rating. The test is whether cash generation, share count and valuation assumptions can justify expectations.

My assessment date is 13 November 2026; my horizon is the following 12-24 months. I see an attractive commercial proposition in Sportradar's sports-data relationships and recurring demand from betting and media customers. But I cannot call the shares cheap or expensive without a contemporaneous, properly sourced quotation and a consistent method for valuing the different share classes.

My business-quality view is cautiously constructive: the operating franchise has demonstrated demand growth and cash generation. My share-valuation view remains conditional. That is a meaningful distinction. An investor can be right about a company becoming larger and still pay too much for its future profits.

Several signals could change my assessment. I would review the next reported quarter's IFRS profit against adjusted EBITDA, the cost and renewal terms of major sports rights, conversion of the IMG ARENA portfolio into cash, any change to the capital-return programme, and regulatory restrictions affecting customers. The FY2025 auditor also reported a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting, while issuing an unqualified opinion on the financial statements themselves. The unresolved control issue belongs on a serious risk checklist, without being misrepresented as proof that the accounts were misstated. The risks, reputation and prospects assessment develops those issues.

This dated judgement may change after new results or rights deals. I am not a financial adviser, and this is not personal advice to buy or sell SRAD.

Readers tracing the company behind the ticker can use the brands, products and subsidiaries map and the markets, partners and licences analysis. Those pages answer the ownership and regulatory questions that an ordinary stock chart cannot.